In Big Gods, Norenzayan (2013) presents the most comprehensive treatment yet of the Big Gods question. The book is a commendable attempt to synthesize the rapidly growing body of survey and experimental research on prosocial effects of religious primes together with cross-cultural data on the distribution of Big Gods. There are, however, a number of problems with the current cross-cultural evidence that weaken support for a causal link between big societies and certain types of Big Gods. Here we attempt to (...) clarify these problems and, in so doing, correct any potential misinterpretation of the cross-cultural findings, provide new insight into the processes generating the patterns observed, and flag directions for future research. (shrink)

We have investigated the emotional profile of dreams and the relationship between dream emotion and cognition using a form that specifically asked subjects to identify emotions within their dreams. Two hundred dream reports were collected from 20 subjects, each of whom produced 10 reports. Compared to previous studies, our method yielded a 10-fold increase in the amount of emotion reported. Anxiety/fear was reported most frequently, followed, in order, by joy/elation, anger, sadness, shame/guilt, and, least frequently, affection/eroticism. Unexpectedly, there was no (...) significant difference in the profiles of emotion reported by men and women. When the reports were scored for bizarreness, a significant correlation was found between the occurrence of bizarreness and major shifts in emotion. These results support the conclusion that dreaming is a mental state whose general emotional features are widely shared across individuals and strongly linked to cognitive features within individual dreams. (shrink)

SummaryHuman height is a heritable trait that is known to be influenced by environmental factors and general standard of living. Individual and population stature is correlated with health, education and economic achievement. Strong sexual selection pressures for stature have been observed in multiple diverse populations, however; there is significant global variance in gender equality and prohibitions on female mate selection. This paper explores the contribution of general standard of living and gender inequality to the variance in global female population heights. (...) Female population heights of 96 nations were culled from previously published sources and public access databases. Factor analysis with United Nations international data on education rates, life expectancy, incomes, maternal and childhood mortality rates, ratios of gender participation in education and politics, the Human Development Index and the Gender Inequality Index was run. Results indicate that population heights vary more closely with gender inequality than with population health, income or education. (shrink)

There is in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit a relatively brief passage at the beginning of Chapter IV, “Self-Consciousness,” which may well be one of the most difficult passages in the whole Hegelian corpus, but which is also of supreme importance for coming to grips with the movement of Hegel’s thought, not only in the Phenomenology but in the entire “system.” It is precisely the difficulty of the passage, it would seem, that explains why it has not been given by commentators (...) an attention proportionate to its significance. So much attention has been focused on the “independence of self-consciousness,” expressed in the sections on “Lordship and Bondage,” “Stoicism and Skepticism” and “The Unhappy Consciousness” — which are, it is true, important and which lend themselves most readily to extended interpretation — that not enough attention has been given to the introductory section, entitled “The Truth of the Certainty of Self,” in which are enunciated the principles which regulate the whole movement of Hegel’s thought. The section might be described as the indispensable transition from those forms of consciousness, which are merely “objective” yet try to give themselves off as authentic knowing, to what Hegel considers to be the only possible way of authenticating the objectivity of human consciousness, i.e., the self, which claims to know, progressively coming to know itself, a self-knowing which will be knowing at all only if it culminates in “absolute knowing.” Only in the light of this section will the preface be intelligible; only in its light will the whole of the Phenomenology hang together. (shrink)

This article explores challenges to accessing opioid treatment programs in rural areas, and offers solutions that would ease these problems.

The sixteen essays in this volume confront the current debate about the relationship between philosophy and its history. On the one hand intellectual historians commonly accuse philosophers of writing bad - anachronistic - history of philosophy, and on the other, philosophers have accused intellectual historians of writing bad - antiquarian - history of philosophy. The essays here address this controversy and ask what purpose the history of philosophy should serve. Part I contains more purely theoretical and methodological discussion, of such (...) questions as whether there are 'timeless' philosophical problems, whether the issues of one epoch are commensurable with those of another, and what style is appropriate to the historiography of the subject. The essays in Part II consider a number of case-histories. They present important revisionist scholarship and original contributions on topics drawn from ancient, early modern and more recent philosophy. All the essays have been specially commissioned, and the contributors include many of the leading figures in the field. The volume as a whole will be of vital interest to everyone concerned with the study of philosophy and of its history. (shrink)

To test the notion that shifts in visual imagery and attention are correlated with experiences of emotion, we studied 10 dream reports using an affirmative probe of emotion and a quantitative measure of plot discontinuity. We found that emotion, especially changes in emotion, are correlated with discontinuities in visual imagery. These correlations are quantified using a new graph theoretical method for analyzing narrative reports.

Introduction Dans les premiers vers de son Roland Furieux, L'Arioste écrit : « Je dirai [...] comment, par amour, il devint furieux et fou, d’homme qui auparavant avait été tenu pour si sage. Je le dirai, si, par celle qui en a fait quasi autant de moi en m’enlevant par moments le peu d’esprit que j’ai, il m’en est pourtant assez laissé pour qu’il me suffise à achever tout ce que j’ai promis ». Ainsi, craint-il, par amour, de perdre la (...) raison avant d'avoir terminé son œuvre mais surtout de se... (shrink)

Background: Prejudices against minorities can be understood as habitually negative evaluations that are kept in spite of evidence to the contrary. Therefore, individuals with strong prejudices might be dominated by habitual or “automatic” reactions at the expense of more controlled reactions. Computational theories suggest individual differences in the balance between habitual/model-free and deliberative/model-based decision-making.Methods: 127 subjects performed the two Step task and completed the blatant and subtle prejudice scale.Results: By using analyses of choices and reaction times in combination with computational (...) modeling, subjects with stronger blatant prejudices showed a shift away from model-based control. There was no association between these decision-making processes and subtle prejudices.Conclusion: These results support the idea that blatant prejudices toward minorities are related to a relative dominance of habitual decision-making. This finding has important implications for developing interventions that target to change prejudices across societies. (shrink)

How do people pursue rewards in risky environments, where some outcomes should be avoided at all costs? We investigate how participant search for spatially correlated rewards in scenarios where one must avoid sampling rewards below a given threshold. This requires not only the balancing of exploration and exploitation, but also reasoning about how to avoid potentially risky areas of the search space. Within risky versions of the spatially correlated multi‐armed bandit task, we show that participants’ behavior is aligned well with (...) a Gaussian process function learning algorithm, which chooses points based on a safe optimization routine. Moreover, using leave‐one‐block‐out cross‐validation, we find that participants adapt their sampling behavior to the riskiness of the task, although the underlying function learning mechanism remains relatively unchanged. These results show that participants can adapt their search behavior to the adversity of the environment and enrich our understanding of adaptive behavior in the face of risk and uncertainty. (shrink)

The new tenseless theory of time, Developed primarily by j j c smart and d h mellor, States that tensed sentence-Utterances cannot be translated by tenseless ones but nevertheless have tenseless truth conditions. Smart and mellor infer from this that the tenseless theory of time is true. The author argues, However, That the rules of use of tensed sentence-Utterances entail that these utterances also have tensed truth conditions. This implies that the tensed theory of time is true.

The aim of this paper is to show that the definition of a possible world in the actualist tradition of A. Plantinga, R.M. Adams, R. Chisholm, J. Pollock and N. Wolterstorff is unable to accomodate tensed states of affairs. An example of a tensed state of affairs is the transiently obtaining state of affairs that the storm is present, which obtains only if its negation, it is not the case that the storm is present also obtains but at different times. (...) A possible world that includes tensed states of affairs and their negations cannot be defined in the traditional way, which states that a possible world is a state of affairs S that includes every state of affairs S' or (exclusive disjunction) the negation of S'. Rather, it must be defined in a new way: A possible world is a state of affairs S that includes every state of affairs S' or (inclusive disjunction) the negation of S', such that for every pair P of mutually contradictory tensed states of affairs entailed by S, the members of P obtain nonsimultaneously in S. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the definition of a possible world in the actualist tradition of A. Plantinga, R.M. Adams, R. Chisholm, J. Pollock and N. Wolterstorff is unable to accomodate tensed states of affairs. An example of a tensed state of affairs is the transiently obtaining state of affairs that the storm is present, which obtains only if its negation, it is not the case that the storm is present also obtains but at different times. (...) A possible world that includes tensed states of affairs and their negations cannot be defined in the traditional way, which states that a possible world is a state of affairs S that includes every state of affairs S' or (exclusive disjunction) the negation of S'. Rather, it must be defined in a new way: A possible world is a state of affairs S that includes every state of affairs S' or (inclusive disjunction) the negation of S', such that for every pair P of mutually contradictory tensed states of affairs entailed by S, the members of P obtain nonsimultaneously in S. (shrink)

Cet article propose un commentaire de la philosophie de l ’ histoire développée par Fichte dans ses conférences sur le Caractère de l’époque actuelle (1804-1805), en tentant de reconstruire les différentes étapes de la fondation spéculative duplan universel de l ’ histoire ( Weltplan ) à partir des propositions métaphysiques exposéespopulairement dans la neuvième conférence. La lecture cherche à mettre en évidence lesdéterminations fondamentales du concept de l ’ histoire (réflexivité, factualité, destinationde l ’ humanité) afin de montrer que la (...) liberté du savoir est le principe dernier de lanécessité du Weltplan et de son effectuation. (shrink)

Inspired by the work of intellectual historian J. G. A. Pocock, this 1993 collection explores the political ideologies of early modern Britain.

To those who are already familiar with the minute and detailed erudition which went into M.J. Petry’s three-volume translation of and commentary on Hegel’s “Philosophy of Subjective Spirit” as presented in the 1830 edition of the Encyclopedia, it will come as no surprise that the same author has presented in this sequel an equally meticulous study of the Berlin “Phenomenology of Spirit.” There is, however, a significant difference to be found in this latter work. Whereas, in the earlier “Philosophy of (...) Subjective Spirit”, Petry was content to translate and comment on the 1845 Zusätze, drawn from a variety of sources by Ludwig Boumann, he has been able in the present text to substitute a set of lecture notes written by Major Karl Gustav von Griesheim who attended Hegel’s lectures in Berlin during the Summer Term of 1825, the most complete single set of notes on those lectures now available. Petry assures us that Griesheim must have taken down Hegel’s lectures word for word, thus, presumably, assuring us of a text which is at once more reliable and more authoritative than the Encyclopedia text which Hegel himself had published - this, despite the many utter incoherences of Griesheim’s text! If nothing else, this explains the disproportionate number of notes devoted to Griesheim’s text rather than to Hegel’s; Petry is concerned not with the Encyclopedia but with the “Lectures” - and Griesheim’s transcript is the most reliable order to make sense out of Griesheim. (shrink)

To those who are already familiar with the minute and detailed erudition which went into M.J. Petry’s three-volume translation of and commentary on Hegel’s “Philosophy of Subjective Spirit” as presented in the 1830 edition of the Encyclopedia, it will come as no surprise that the same author has presented in this sequel an equally meticulous study of the Berlin “Phenomenology of Spirit.” There is, however, a significant difference to be found in this latter work. Whereas, in the earlier “Philosophy of (...) Subjective Spirit”, Petry was content to translate and comment on the 1845 Zusätze, drawn from a variety of sources by Ludwig Boumann, he has been able in the present text to substitute a set of lecture notes written by Major Karl Gustav von Griesheim who attended Hegel’s lectures in Berlin during the Summer Term of 1825, the most complete single set of notes on those lectures now available. Petry assures us that Griesheim must have taken down Hegel’s lectures word for word, thus, presumably, assuring us of a text which is at once more reliable and more authoritative than the Encyclopedia text which Hegel himself had published - this, despite the many utter incoherences of Griesheim’s text! If nothing else, this explains the disproportionate number of notes devoted to Griesheim’s text rather than to Hegel’s; Petry is concerned not with the Encyclopedia but with the “Lectures” - and Griesheim’s transcript is the most reliable order to make sense out of Griesheim. (shrink)

Pocock, J. G. A. (John Greville Agard) 1924- "Quentin Skinner: The History of Politics and the Politics of History" Common Knowledge - Volume 10, Issue 3, Fall 2004, pp. 532-550.

This collection of essays is the definitive version of a widely discussed debate over the origins of the New Theory of Reference. In new articles, written especially for this volume, Quentin Smith and Scott Soames, the original participants in the debate, elaborate their positions on who was responsible for the ideas that Saul Kripke presented in his Naming and Necessity. They are joined by John Burgess, who weighs in on the side of Soames, while Smith adds a further dimension (...) in discussing the contributions of philosophers such as Follesdal, Geach, Hintikka, and Plantinga. Also included are lengthy excerpts from Follesdal's 1961 Harvard dissertation and a careful examination by Sten Lindstrom of the respective contributions of Kripke and Stig Kanger to the development of modal semantics. The collection will be essential reading for anyone acquainted with these influential ideas. (shrink)

Quentin Meillassoux’s 2006 After Finitude offered a sharp critique of the phenomenological project, charging that phenomenology was one of the “two principal media” of correlationism—ultimately reducible to an “extreme idealism.” Meillassoux grounds this accusation in an account of givenness that presupposes that “every variety of givenness” finds its genesis within the positing of the subject. However, this critique fails to hit its mark precisely because it presupposes an account of intuitive givenness that is entirely foreign to the phenomenological project. (...) Quite against Meillassoux’s conflation of givenness, the world-for-us, and the positing subject—the very centre of the phenomenological project is the recognition that intuitive givenness cannot be reduced to the constructive activity of the subject. Givenness is marked by a heterogeneity; givenness refers to what is given to us, not to what emerges from us. (shrink)